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Electronic waste (e-waste) is thought to be the fastest growing segment of the overall solid waste stream
in many countries. Between 2003 and 2010 more than half of all Canadian provinces and US states passed
legislation speciﬁcally to govern the disposition of e-waste. The purpose of this research is to investigate
the legal geographies of this legislation. The principle ﬁndings are that the work of jurisdiction around
e-waste in Canada and the US places ﬁnancial responsibility for waste management on consumers not
producers. Thus, contra the explicit intent of e-waste legislation, a regime of extended consumer, rather
than producer, responsibility is emerging and waste generated as a result of design and manufacturing
decisions remains taboo. But the implications of the legislative governance of e-waste go beyond ques-
tions of regulatory success or failure. At stake in the legislative governance of e-waste is the assembling
of the social in a legal way that generates distributions of action that are democratized only so long as
they limit public decision making to waste already produced and marketized only so long as they extend
the ability of manufacturers, e-waste recyclers, and paramarket organizations to appropriate value. The
work of jurisdiction around e-waste suggests jurisdiction can be more multiple, distributed, and patchy
than prevailing theory allows.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Electronic waste (e-waste), the material detritus of the informa-
tion age, is claimed to be the fastest growing segment of the solid
waste stream globally (Schwarzner et al., 2005). By the middle of
the ﬁrst decade of the 21st Century, Canadians were estimated to
be disposing of more than 140,000 tonnes of e-waste annually
(Environment Canada, 2003) and Americans more than 1.3 million
(US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Between 2003 and
2010, over half of all Canadian provinces and US states passed leg-
islation governing the management of e-waste. Two overarching
commonalities exist in all this legislation. First, all the legislation
takes it as axiomatic that e-waste is a post-consumer waste man-
agement problem. Second, that the remedy to the problem so
framed is to institute a regime of extended producer responsibility
(EPR) whereby manufacturers take on the ﬁnancial and/or physical
duty for managing end of life electronics. EPR will, it is claimed,
force manufacturers to internalize the costs of managing the dispo-
sition of post-consumer electronics and thus incentivize manufac-
turers toward green(er) design and manufacturing.
In this paper I make two arguments about the legislative gover-
nance of e-waste in Canada and the US. First, I claim that what
Valverde (2009) calls the ‘work of jurisdiction’ operates againstY-NC-ND license. instituting EPR systems. Examining the work of jurisdiction in
the legislative governance of e-waste shows that the ﬁnancial
responsibility for e-waste management is delegated to consumers,
rather than producers. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that the
emerging legislative governance of e-waste in Canada and the US
will succeed in instituting an EPR regime that results in clean(er)
and green(er) manufacturing of electronics. Second, I argue that
considerably more is at stake in the work of jurisdiction governing
e-waste than the merits and demerits of particular waste manage-
ment schemes. In the technicalities of the work of jurisdiction over
e-waste are settlements over how democratic forms of politics and
capitalist forms of markets are to be assembled and distributed.
Said differently, the legislative governance of e-waste in provincial
and state jurisdictions is the assembling of the social in a legal way
(Latour, 2005, 2009) that generates distributions of action that are
democratized only so long as they limit public decision making to
waste already produced and marketized only so long as they ex-
tend the ability of manufacturers, e-waste recyclers, and paramar-
ket organizations (e.g., trade associations and NGOs, see Section 8)
to appropriate value.
E-waste laws in Canada and the US are promulgated by provin-
cial and state jurisdictions, rather than their respective federal gov-
ernments. As such, the story of e-waste legislation might appear to
be a simple one of sub-national jurisdictions regulating a particular
waste stream. However, when the work of jurisdiction is explored
Table 1
Electronic devices covered under Canadian and US e-waste legislation.
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nuanced understanding of jurisdiction and its effects: we can see
that jurisdiction can be an assemblage of legal elsewheres enfolded
into its composition rather than a self-referential legal container.
Thus a contribution of the paper is to show that provincial and
state jurisdictions are assemblages of legal elsewheres that do
not necessarily sit in a straightforward hierarchy of legalized scales
(e.g., municipal < provincial/state < federal). They can instead be
multiple, distributed, and patchy legal spaces that borrow from
elsewhere and extend themselves beyond their own borders. I also
show that the work of jurisdiction in the legislative governance of
e-waste plays an ontologically generative role in producing that
which it claims to only govern (e-waste). In partially generating
the phenomenon it claims to only govern, one of the effects of
the work of jurisdiction is to distribute ﬁnancial responsibility
for managing e-waste away from manufactures and toward con-
sumer–citizens (Johnston, 2008; Jubas, 2007). Thus this article con-
tributes to broader discussions in legal geography about the
political and economic effects of law–space relations and investi-
gating legal concepts like jurisdiction as other than merely neutral
legal technicalities (Blomley, 1994).To investigate the legal geographies of e-waste legislation in
Canada and the US a database of all provincial and state jurisdic-
tions that have introduced e-waste legislation was created. The
analysis discussed in this paper is conﬁned to those jurisdictions
that not only introduced, but actually passed such legislation by
the end of 2010 (six Canadian provinces and 24 US states). The
database consists of the full text of the laws in digital format
downloaded from the relevant authority of each jurisdiction, asso-
ciated documents (e.g., press releases from waste management
authorities; industry and NGO documents), and a spreadsheet used
to categorize the language of each jurisdiction’s e-waste law. The
entire text of all laws in each jurisdiction were read and catego-
rized. The categories discussed in this paper include: (1) how the
laws deﬁne e-waste (see Table 1); (2) whether and how each law
includes language about trans-jurisdictional shipments of e-waste;
(3) whether and how each law includes references to other juris-
dictions (e.g., municipal, provincial/state, federal, European Union,
and/or international conventions such as the Basel Convention
and/or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment); (4) the funding model used in each jurisdiction to ﬁnance
the handling of e-waste; and (5) the nature of the ﬂow of funds
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ers to manufactures to provincial/state authorities and/or industry
funding organizations or some other variation).
The paper is organized into several parts and situates my argu-
ments at the intersection of legal studies of jurisdiction and cul-
tural studies of waste. First, I discuss the meaning and relation
between key concepts I use to develop the paper’s central argu-
ments about the legal geographies of e-waste in Canada and the
US. Here I put Valverde’s (2009) notion of the work of jurisdiction
into conversation with Gille’s (2007) argument about waste
regimes, Mol’s (2002) discussion of the ‘politics-of-what’, and
Latour’s (2005, 2009) arguments about law as a key device for
assembling the social. Next, I discuss the broader importance of
waste and wasting for legal geographic thought. Here I suggest that
legal controversies around waste and wasting are far more than
mere epiphenomenon. Such controversies raise fundamental ques-
tions about the adjudication of particular notions of jurisdiction,
allied notions of private property, and how they are to be done
in societies that value particular understandings of freedom and
a balance between state regulation and the free individual. Third,
I offer a brief review of literature analyzing e-waste legislation. A
striking characteristic of this literature is that it typically assumes
that such legislation will result in manufacturers internalizing the
costs of managing their end of life products; yet the literature
avoids engaging with the technicalities of such legislation which,
I argue, suggest such results are unlikely to be obtained. I then turn
to consider a detailed analysis of the work of jurisdiction in the leg-
islative governance of e-waste. First, I examine what the legislative
governance of e-waste governs. While it may seem obvious, the
what generates highly particular framings of post-consumer elec-
tronics quawaste, an important effect of which is to make links be-
tween manufacturing and waste production taboo for public
decision making. Next, I examine the where of e-waste legislative
governance. Here I document a ‘simple’ legal geography of e-waste
legislation in Canada and the US (i.e., the presence/absence of e-
waste legislation in provinces and states). But I also demonstrate
a more nuanced legal geography of jurisdiction, one that compli-
cates the notion of jurisdiction as a discreet territory co-extensive
with its own legalized borders. Jurisdiction, as it is performed in e-
waste legislation in Canada and the US, is an amalgam of legal
elsewheres. At the same time, its reach explicitly and implicitly ex-
ceeds its provincial or state borders to jurisdictions outside Canada
and the US and into the domestic manufacturing systems of so-
called ‘developing countries’. The paper then turns to the issue of
how the legislative governance of e-waste gets done in Canadian
and US jurisdictions. Here I claim that there is a contradiction be-
tween a key goal of e-waste legislation – encouraging EPR – and
how the various systems are actually ﬁnanced. I show that rather
than manufacturers being forced to internalize the costs of e-waste
disposal, those costs are typically passed onto consumer–citizens,
thus attenuating if not defeating a key intent of e-waste legislation.
The penultimate section of the paper examines the who of e-waste
legislation. Here I discuss the effects of consumer–citizens ﬁnanc-
ing the recycling systems as well as the roles played by a variety of
paramarket organizations. I then conclude with a discussion of the
implications of the legislative governance of e-waste in Canadian
and US jurisdictions and brieﬂy discuss some possible improve-
ments that could be made.2. Conceptualizing legal geographies of e-waste in Canada and
the US
The two arguments in the paper contribute to the debates and
discussions in the legal geographies literature about the nature of
jurisdiction. Ford (1999) claims that the legal concept of jurisdictionhas shifted over time to become axiomatically linked with territory,
while Blomley contends that ‘‘legal concepts like jurisdiction [. . .]
necessitate the creation of spaces’’ (Blomley, 2005, p. 282). Without
denying the importance of law–space relations, Valverde (2009, p.
152) questions the necessity of a jurisdiction-territory link. Instead,
she advocates examining the work of jurisdiction and how its
technicalities generate scaled temporal and spatial legal order
within which other aspects of legal practice are enacted (e.g., the
adjudication of cases in courts). Valverde deﬁnes the ‘work of
jurisdiction’ as ‘‘the governance of legal governance’’ (2009, p.
141). Jurisdiction sorts and organizes questions about the what,
who, and where of legal governance, though not necessarily in that
order. Thework of jurisdiction is a kind of ‘‘chain reaction’’ whereby
if one of these questions is answered, the rest seem to fall into place
and determine the how of governance (Valverde, 2009, p. 144). The
notion of the work of jurisdiction as an ordering practice resonates
with literature that argues that waste and wasting entail human
and nonhuman action that is order making and generative of
moral cosmologies, rather than merely being residuals of them
(e.g., Benidickson, 2007; Douglas, 1966; Drackner, 2005; Kretsch-
mer, 2000; O’Brien, 1999; Postill, 2003; Shove, 2003; Thompson,
1979).
In Canada and the US, legislation governing e-waste enacts con-
tingent, rather than necessary, ontologies of waste; realities, in
other words, are at stake (Law, 2010). Here I bring Valverde’s work
into conversation with that of Gille (2007, 2010) and Mol (1999,
2002) to help think through the workings of jurisdiction and its
politics in Canadian and US e-waste legislation. Gille’s notion of a
waste regime is helpful because such regimes are deﬁned by spe-
ciﬁc institutional arrangements that structure the ‘‘rights and
rules’’ for adjudicating what and how that which becomes waste
is produced in the ﬁrst place as well as who gets what wastes,
where, how, and under what conditions (Gille, 2010, p. 1056).
For Gille the notion of waste regimes has a political edge, for ‘‘[i]f
waste production – that is, how much and what kind of wastes
can be produced – is excluded from public discourse, the most that
democracy can achieve is to regulate what to do with wastes al-
ready produced’’ (Gille, 2007, p. 210). Thus questions of waste,
Gille argues, are more than mere technical management decisions.
They are also fundamental questions about how political forms and
market forms are to be assembled and distributed (cf., Bulkeley
et al., 2005; Davies, 2008; Lane, 2011; Moore, 2009). In this sense,
controversies around waste can be instructive for legal geographic
thought for the ways in which they can highlight the workings of
key concepts such as jurisdiction.
To explore what is at stake in the legal governance of e-waste in
Canada and the US I draw on Mol’s (2002) notion of a politics-of-
what. As Mol argues, a politics-of-what asks us to consider,
‘‘[w]hich goods are sought after, which bads fought? And in which
ways are these goodnesses set up as being good’’ (Mol, 2002, p.
176)? For Mol, a politics-of-what is concerned with exploring the
differences between various enactments of a phenomenon. For
example, e-waste is typically enacted as an inevitable and neces-
sary outcome of consumers using and subsequently throwing away
their electronic products. Yet, e-waste could be enacted otherwise.
It could, for example, be practiced as also, or even primarily, the
outcome of decisions made ‘upstream’ in the design and manufac-
turing of those products. Design and manufacturing, after all,
determine the material composition, durability, repair- and re-
use-ability, and the ease or difﬁculty of recycling products. A poli-
tics-of-what proposes that different enactments of a phenomenon
entail an ontological multiplicity to things. In Mol’s work multi-
plicity is meant to convey ‘‘manyfoldedness, but not pluralism’’
(Mol, 2002, p. 84). Here Mol’s ideas resonate with work in legal
studies that develop understandings of jurisdiction through prac-
tices of interlegality (Butler, 2009; Valverde, 2009, 2010; see also
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to be constituted by the folding together of multiple legal realities,
including those practiced in jurisdictions elsewhere.
Building on the ideas above I take interlegality to be genera-
tive of jurisdiction and the work of jurisdiction to involve sorting
out the what, the where, the how, and the who of the legislative
governance of e-waste. My basic argument is that the work of
jurisdiction actually operates against the main goal of the legisla-
tive governance of e-waste in Canada and the US: the creation of
waste regimes premised on EPR. As I demonstrate in Sections 7
and 8, it is consumer–citizens, not manufacturers, who ﬁnance
the collection and recycling systems for e-waste in each jurisdic-
tion in both countries. The net result is that in practice, contra the
common explicit intent of e-waste legislation, manufacturing
practices remain unaffected by the laws ostensibly promulgated
to incentivize them toward EPR and green(er) design. In this
sense, production remains taboo for democratic decision making.
From the latter claim, I also pursue a second but somewhat
more speculative argument in the paper: the legislative gover-
nance of e-waste in provincial and state jurisdictions is the assem-
bling of the social in a legal way that generates distributions of
action that are democratized only so long as they limit public deci-
sion making to waste already produced and marketized only so
long as they extend the ability of manufacturers, e-waste recyclers,
and paramarket organizations to appropriate value. Here I bring
the ideas of Valverde, Gille, and Mol into conversation with the
work of Latour. For Latour, ‘the social’ is a result, rather than a
cause; it must be repeatedly composed and law is one among
many devices that compose – or assemble – the social (see Landri
and Latour, 2011; Levi and Valverde, 2008; Latour, 2005, 2009). To
say that law assembles the social in a legal way is to say that law is
a particular kind of device for linking together a vast collection of
otherwise unlike things and make decisions about their order
and relation to one another. In the speciﬁc case of e-waste law in
Canada and the US, the collection of otherwise unlike things linked
together include, for example, moral values and commands (e.g.,
‘do the right thing’), microprocessors, hard-drives, metals that
may be precious and/or have toxic characteristics, and plastics
doped with ﬂame retardants that can negatively affect human
and environmental health (e.g., polybrominated diphenyl ethers);
they also include, among other things, the territories of provinces,
states, and nations, labor conditions, toxicological science, multi-
national corporations, and citizens. Another way of expressing this
idea is to say law is a ‘worlding’ (see Haraway, 2008; Roy and Ong,
2011; Spivak, 1985; Tsing, 2005); its performance gathers up a col-
lection of not necessarily like things – states/provinces, junked
electronic devices, manufacturers, labor conditions, moral respon-
sibility, recycling companies, public ﬁnances, lawyers, private prof-
its – in such a way that this heterogenous collection is enacted as if
they all inhabit the same common world. Law is generative of mor-
al cosmological order rather than a neutral technicality (Blomley,
1994).
The legal geographies of e-waste governance in Canada and the
US accept as axiomatic that it is right and proper for manufacturers
to maintain the right to determine the material fates of their prod-
ucts (e.g., their chemical composition) while citizens (e.g., via their
elected representatives) and other organizations such as NGOs and
trade associations may deﬁne what counts as recycling, targets for
it, and what counts as ‘safe’ forms of waste management (e.g.,
landﬁlling or waste-to-energy incineration, see Gille, 2007). In
many cases, such deﬁnitions of recycling and proper waste man-
agement include prohibitions against particular types of trade
(e.g., exports of e-waste to ‘developing’ countries) and labor prac-
tices (e.g., use of prison labor). So the legislative governance of e-
waste extends beyond strictly waste management to include regu-
lating trade and labor conditions. Thus, in practice, the legal geog-raphies of Canadian and US e-waste governance generate limits to,
and extensions of, provincial and state jurisdiction: they limit
democratic decision making to wastes already produced and refuse
to, as it were, extend it beyond the factory gate into the manufac-
turing of products that will eventually be bought and used by con-
sumer–citizens in Canada and the US. At the same time, they
implicitly and explicitly extend jurisdiction beyond the territorial
borders of the provinces and states in which they are promulgated
by regulating where, under what conditions, and who may right-
fully receive and work with potentially valuable post-consumer
electronics. Thus, more fundamental issues are at stake in the legal
technicalities of managing a particular waste stream. In those tech-
nicalities, the social is being assembled in a legal way that corrals
democratic action to the purview of waste already produced and
extends market action to additional appropriations of value (be-
yond the purchase price) by manufacturers, e-waste recyclers,
and a variety paramarket organizations.3. Legal geographic thought, the work of jurisdiction, and waste
Legal controversies around waste and wasting in Canada and
the US heard in the two countries’ higher courts are instructive
for legal geographic thought. Indeed, such controversies demon-
strate how waste and wasting cut to the heart of settlements about
how the social ought to be assembled. Such cases in Canada and
the US have centered on two issues: (1) people’s rights to privacy,
principally around the issue of police powers of search and seizure
and (2) the rights of municipal or regional authorities to regulate
ﬂow control of solid waste (i.e., to require such waste to be deliv-
ered – or ﬂow – to particular processing or disposal facilities in
speciﬁc jurisdictions). The ﬁrst type of case places the legal contro-
versies around waste at the center of fundamental values en-
shrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights (Section 8) and the US
Constitution (Fourth Amendment). The second type of case raises
fundamental questions about the distribution of federal, provin-
cial/state, and municipal powers. Both types of case suggest how
legal controversies around waste are about settling issues at the
heart of assembling what it is to live in societies deﬁned by liberal
notions of freedom premised on particular notions of private prop-
erty and allied expectations about privacy, the reach of police pow-
ers of search and seizure, and the proper distribution of sovereign
jurisdictional power (more generally see Blomley, 1994; Delaney,
2001).
Canadian and US higher court cases involving questions about
waste and the lawfulness of police search and seizure, tend to
mobilize two legal doctrines: abandonment and curtilage. In cases
where the doctrine of abandonment predominates, it is delibera-
tions over what a human agent intended to do with things by plac-
ing them at a given locale, not whether the things themselves so
abandoned constitute ‘property’. Thus, the intent to abandon
things (be they ‘property’, ‘junk’ or something else) is deemed to
extinguish private property interests in those things and thus
any reasonable expectations of privacy vested in notions of private,
personal property. This was the line of reasoning in R v. Patrick (R.v.
Patrick Between Her Majesty the Queen, Respondent, and Russell
Stephen Patrick, Appellant, 2007; MacKinnon, 2008), a Canadian
narcotics case that involved police reaching from a lane-way over
the private property line of a home to search trash left by the
defendant for municipal garbage collection. The court dismissed
Patrick’s claim of warrantless search and seizure because he,
‘‘abandoned any privacy interest he had in the items in his garbage
by leaving his garbage out for collection. It did not matter that the
garbage was on Patrick’s property’’ (R.v. Patrick Between Her Maj-
esty the Queen, Respondent, and Russell Stephen Patrick, Appel-
lant, 2007, p. 1). In the US, similar arguments were mobilized at
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wood, 1988). In this case, the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court’s decision to dismiss narcotics charges because they resulted
from a warrantless search of a private individual’s trash left for col-
lection on the street. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not grant protection from warrantless search
and seizure of trash left for collection outside the curtilage of a
home. Like the Patrick case, the work of jurisdiction in the Green-
wood case relied on the where of the ‘stuff’ of trash relative to
the boundaries of land-based private property (the curtilage of
the home) to decide the case, while avoiding the question of
whether trash itself constitutes property or not. Here, then, we
can see the important work of jurisdiction in action as the chain
reaction of legal governance unfolds and a legal decision is made
by answering the question of where the stuff of trash is while hold-
ing in abeyance the question what it is (i.e., private property, junk,
or something else).
The work of jurisdiction in cases deliberating over ﬂow control
ordinances operates similarly in that it holds the property status of
waste in suspension. Disputes in such cases have been argued in
terms of the right of municipal or regional authorities to regulate
the mandatory use of particular processing and disposal facilities.
In Canada, for example, a key case was argued over the legal right
of a municipality (Halifax, Nova Scotia) to institute a ﬂow control
by-law requiring all waste generated in the municipality to only
be disposed of within its own boundaries (Halifax (Regional
Municipality) v. Ed DeWolfe Trucking Ltd., 2007). The plaintiff, a
private garbage hauling company, argued that the municipal by-
law invoked extra-jurisdictional power (by disallowing disposal
outside the municipality) that effectively created a monopoly,
something only provincial law can do. Thus, it was argued on the
part of the plaintiff that the municipality lacked the legal authority
over ﬂow control that it claimed. Initially the case was decided in
favor of the plaintiff but was later overturned by the provincial su-
preme court. In the US, similar cases have been fought over ﬂow
control where the plaintiffs (typically private garbage hauling
ﬁrms) have claimed such laws violate the US Constitution’s dor-
mant commerce clause (Diederich, 2003). Indeed, in 1994 the US
Supreme Court struck down ﬂow control laws because they were
found to violate the commerce clause, and are thus unconstitu-
tional (C and A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 1994). Recently, how-
ever, in a similar dispute the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a
regional public authority because its ﬂow control law required pro-
cessing at public, rather than private, facilities (United Haulers
Association v. Oneida-Herkimer, 2007). Consequently, because
the law favored a public processing facility as opposed to a private
one, the ﬂow control law was found to discriminate against all pri-
vate interests equally and thus not in violation of the dormant
commerce clause.
The legal rulings on ﬂow control have argued that it is not the
waste that is the article of commerce (i.e., the commodity), it is
the service of processing it and disposing of it that is (Diederich,
1993, 2003). As in cases of police search and seizure, what is
important to note here is that the jumble of material things that
constitute waste are, at least transiently, free of property relations
in them and are instead deﬁned by jurisdictional relations around
them. In a sense, waste is like a black hole in the cosmology of
property relations and the fundamental role property typically
plays in deciding questions of jurisdiction in Canadian and US
law. At stake in these legal cases, then, are adjudications of partic-
ular notions of jurisdiction, allied notions of private property, and
how they are to be done in societies that value particular under-
standings of freedom and a balance between state regulation and
the free individual. The work of jurisdiction with respect to waste
is, then, an assembling of the social, a ‘worlding’; it is generative of
moral cosmological order rather than a neutral technicality.Linking the work of jurisdiction with worldings or moral cos-
mologies of waste and wasting returns us to Gille’s politics of
waste and Mol’s politics-of-what. If we want to compose (see Har-
away, 2008; Latour, 2010; Stengers, 2005) a safer material world
then, as Gille argues, it cannot be taboo to discuss the democrati-
zation of production and to search for ways that citizens can par-
ticipate more directly in the design and production decisions that
fate the material lives of the products we purchase (see also
Thorpe, 1992). Thinking with Valverde, Gille, Mol, and Latour
among others, I claim that more is at stake than mere legal techni-
calities in the legislative governance of e-waste. These technicali-
ties are partially generative of the jurisdictions in which they are
promulgated and of that which the jurisdictions claim to govern.
Through these technicalities, the social is assembled in a legal
way that generates distributions of worldly action that corral pub-
lic decision making to deliberations over waste already produced
while reproducing and expanding the ability of manufacturers, e-
waste recyclers, and paramarket organizations to appropriate
value.4. Legal analyses of e-waste legislation
Legal analyses of e-waste regulations began to emerge in 2000,
catalyzed by the publication of European Commission reports on
priority waste streams in the mid-1990s (Cooper, 2000). Since
then, the literature has proliferated and focused primarily on inter-
national law such as the Basel Convention (e.g., Aniyie, 2009; Bo-
land, 2004) and/or emerging e-waste regulation in Europe and
the US, though a few studies have examined legislation in Asia,
notably in China (e.g., Lin et al., 2002; Zhang andWei, 2009; Zhang,
2009; Chung and Zhang, 2011) and India (e.g., Krishna and Kulsh-
restha, 2008; Patnaik and Mohanta, 2007). Notwithstanding the
temporal development and geographic diversity of the literature,
it tends to divide along three lines of examination. These include
proper enforcement and compliance, jurisdictional effectiveness,
and the proper division of responsibility between producers, con-
sumers, and governments for waste management schemes.
The enforcement and compliance literature focuses on assess-
ing the reasons for lapses in enforcement of, and compliance with,
existing legislation. The reasons identiﬁed tend to highlight regula-
tory loopholes, lax enforcement, and regulatory complexity or con-
fusion over the status of particular objects and materials as
e-waste (e.g., Krishna and Kulshrestha, 2008; Kutz, 2006; Maxiano-
va, 2008; Mckenna, 2007; Templeton, 2008). Adjacent themes in
the literature are that of jurisdictional effectiveness and the proper
division of responsibility for managing post-consumption e-waste.
These analyses include discussions of the need for coordination
and/or standardization of laws between jurisdictions (e.g., federal
versus state in the US or national versus regional in the EU) in or-
der to avoid the potential pitfalls of a patchwork regulatory land-
scape (e.g., Bergner, 2004; Billinghurst, 2005; Boon, 2005; Daub,
2004; Drayton, 2007; Gibson and Tierney, 2006; Hagen, 2005; Her-
at, 2009; Konoval, 2006; Kuschnik, 2008; Short, 2004).
Meanwhile, debates about the proper division of responsibility
for managing post-consumption e-waste focus on the merits of EPR
based legislation (e.g., Boland, 2004; Courtney, 2006; Fordyce,
2004; Hollerud, 2009; Knee, 2009; Pak, 2008; Towle et al., 2004).
Typically, EPR programs are intended to shift the ﬁnancial cost of
managing end of life products away from general taxpayers and
public authorities to the speciﬁc manufacturers of those products
and to the consumers who buy them. Such a shift is a key beneﬁt
of EPR programs because they can help public authorities save
money while also providing a ﬂow of funds for waste management
and, at least potentially, incentivizing manufactures toward
green(er) design of their products. Brieﬂy, EPR can take different
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collective producer- or individual-producer responsibility (IPR)
(Lindhqvist and Lifset, 2003; Rossem et al., 2006). Collective EPR
systems shift responsibility for end of life products to a group of
producers of a whole class of manufactures (e.g., electronics or
cars). Since all producers in such a system share responsibility
for their own and each other’s end of life products, the incentive
for any single producer to make design changes that would reduce
the costs of recycling or reuse are diluted. Consequently, it is ar-
gued, IPR systems are more effective than collective EPR systems
because individual manufacturers are ﬁnancially and/or physically
responsible for managing their own branded products at end of
life. As such, manufacturers in an IPR system have greater incen-
tives for changing the design of their products so as to reduce their
costs of recycling or reuse. IPR in combination with a fee structure
that differentiates between, for example, toxicity, recyclability,
and/or reusability of products, is argued to be an effective way to
incentivize producers toward clean(er) production. What is strik-
ing in the literature on e-waste legislation, however, is that the
mere presence of legislation premised on EPR is assumed to
achieve the internalization by manufacturers of costs for e-waste
management. Little attention is paid to the technical details of
ﬁnancing the recycling and take-back systems implemented under
such legislation and how they impact the actual division of respon-
sibility for e-waste management. While some analyses recognize
that some responsibility is allocated to consumers (e.g., Courtney,
2006; Fordyce, 2004; Towle et al., 2004), the assumption remains
taken for granted that manufacturers will be forced to internalize
the costs of disposal as a consequence of such legislation. Yet, an
analysis of the jurisdictional technicalities of ﬁnancing in Canadian
and US e-waste legislation suggest such an outcome to be highly
unlikely.5. What
The axiomatic framing of e-waste as a post-consumer waste
management problem is a particular – even peculiar – one which
a brief consideration of studies in occupational health and environ-
mental engineering highlights. The former raises questions about
the health effects on workers in semiconductor manufacturing pro-
cesses. Some studies suggest there are links between increased
incidences of some cancers and other health problems related to
the use of particular types of chemicals, especially solvents (e.g.,
Beall et al., 2005; Bender et al., 2007; Clapp, 2006). In the latter,
engineers have investigated the environmental impacts of micro-
chip manufacturing. One study measuring inputs of fossil fuels,
chemicals, and water ﬁnds that ‘‘[s]ecodnary materials used in pro-
duction total 630 times the mass of the ﬁnal product [the micro-
chip]’’ (Williams et al., 2002, p. 5509). This makes energy and
material use in microchip manufacturing, ‘‘orders of magnitude
larger than for ‘traditional’ goods’’ such as automobiles (Williams
et al., 2002, p. 5509).1 Unsurprisingly, the claims about negative
health and environmental impacts of semiconductor manufacturing
are disputed by computer manufacturers (Bailar et al., 2007; Shad-
man and McManus, 2004). Yet these controversies about manufac-
turing are never framed in terms of having anything to do with
‘waste’. So, despite that chemical compounds such as solvents used
in semiconductor manufacturing are not incorporated into the ﬁnal
product and end up in the wrong place (see Douglas, 1966) – work-
ers’ bodies – they are not framed as ‘waste’ in the controversies
about them. Though the material and energy intensity of producing1 The automobile as an example of a ‘traditional good’ is used by the authors of the
study. Their claim is based on the comparison of 1600 g of fossil fuel inputs needed to
produce a 2 g microchip and 1500–3000 kg of such inputs required to manufacture a
car (Williams et al., 2002, p. 5509).a microchip exceeds by orders of magnitude the material and energy
intensity of automobile manufacturing, this is is not framed as a
‘wasteful’ use of matter and energy. These examples highlight the
idea that materials have no necessary ontological status as waste,
they are enacted as such. In this sense, to practice e-waste as a
post-consumption waste management problem is a ‘worlding’, a
generation of a particular moral cosmology in which waste and value
could be practiced and ordered otherwise.
Yet even e-waste practiced as a post-consumption problem
generates an ontological multiplicity of e-waste qua waste. What
counts as e-waste varies between jurisdictions (see Table 1). Cana-
dian provinces share a relatively consistent deﬁnition of e-waste,
but not all provinces have legislation in place to govern its man-
agement. Thus, in practice a computer disposed of in Nova Scotia
is also e-waste in ﬁve other provinces. If it is disposed of in Nova
Scotia, it will be routed through a system of collection and trans-
portation that will eventually lead to its constituent parts and
materials being processed at one of three approved facilities near
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Montreal, Quebec, or Toronto, Ontario
(ACES, n.d.) before being moved along (Gregson et al., 2007) for
subsequent processing and transformation into inputs for energy
generation, smelting, and manufacturing. In the remaining prov-
inces and territories it is something else. For example, in St. John’s,
Newfoundland it is ‘‘bulk garbage’’ (City of St. John’s, n.d.) in which
case it will be taken to the municipal landﬁll.
In contrast to Canadian jurisdictions, deﬁnitions of what counts
as e-waste varies widely between US states. While a desktop com-
puter disposed of in Connecticut or Hawaii is e-waste, only its
monitor is in California. Computer peripherals such as keyboards
and mice count as e-waste in Indiana, Connecticut, and Minnesota
but not in Illinois, Missouri, or Maryland. The importance of these
inclusions and exclusions is how they enact an ontological multi-
plicity to e-waste. Disposal of a particular electronic object is not
itself a guarantee of its ontological status as e-waste. That status
is enacted by the coordination of practices of disposal and those
of regulation in a given jurisdiction. In this sense the what of juris-
diction partially generates the reality it claims to only govern.6. Where
In less than a decade, more than half all provincial and state
jurisdictions have passed legislation governing the post-consump-
tion disposition of e-waste (see Fig. 1). Yet each of these jurisdic-
tions is enacted through distributed associations with, and
references to, jurisdictions elsewhere. Rather than being co-exten-
sive with their own legalized provincial or state borders, they are
comprised by amalgams of legal elsewheres. Their reach also ex-
tends beyond their own borders and even beyond their respective
nation states. Most provincial and state laws in Canada and the US
explicitly incorporate legal rules deﬁned outside their own juris-
diction. For example, they incorporate the laws of other provinces
or states, federal laws, and/or international laws or conventions
such as the Basel Convention, the European Union’s Reduction of
Hazardous Substances directive, or OECD Decision C(2001)107,
the inter-governmental body’s revision to its policy on the trans-
boundary movements of wastes destined for recovery operations
(OECD, 2004). Rather than monolithic blocks of legal space, then,
provincial and state jurisdiction over e-waste is characterized by
interlegality, the enfolding of multiple legal elsewheres into their
own composition. Jurisdiction can, then, have characteristics that
make it more multiple, distributed, and patchy than a conceptual-
ization of it as an unambiguously bounded territory (see Ford,
1999) allows.
The ﬁrst province in Canada to regulate e-waste was Alberta.
Like other provinces, Alberta relies on a non-proﬁt organization
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gram. The Alberta Recycling Management Authority (ARMA), ﬁrst
published a list of requirements for processors of ‘‘end-of-life elec-
tronics’’ in 2004 (Alberta Recycling Management Authority, 2004,
p. 1). Those regulations require, inter alia, that processors ‘‘comply
with all applicable environmental regulations (international, fed-
eral, provincial/state, and municipal)’’ and ‘‘[e]nsure that no elec-
tronic materials are shipped to developing and non-OECD
countries’’ (Alberta Recycling Management Authority, 2004, pp.
1–2). The year before Alberta began regulating e-waste an indus-
try-led non-proﬁt organization called Electronics Product Steward-
ship Canada (EPSC) formed to develop ‘‘a national electronics end-
of-life program in Canada’’ (EPSC, n.d.). EPSC has no regulatory
power of its own, but its Recycling Standard has provided a tem-
plate for each of the provincial management authorities delegated
by law to manage e-waste. This standard currently requires that,
among other things, electronics recyclers comply with Canada’s
Export and Import of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Recyclable
Material Regulation and that no export to ‘‘non-OECD/non-EU
countries’’ occur (EPSC, 2009, p. 4). All Canadian provincial pro-
grams prohibit exports of e-waste to non-OECD/non-EU countriesFig. 1. Canadian and US jurisdictiand to countries listed as non-Annex VII of the Basel Convention
(all signatory countries except the EU, the OECD, and Lichtenstein).
Thus, multiple jurisdictions that include national laws, interna-
tional laws, and conventions are folded together through the
EPSC’s Recycling Standard and through it into the jurisdictional
spaces regulating e-waste in Canadian provinces. What we begin
to see, then, is that jurisdiction is not necessarily a smooth, self-ref-
erential legal container. Instead it is multiple, many-folded, and
distributed. It is simultaneously within and outside itself; it is
interlegal. The multiplicity to e-waste legal governance is the
norm, rather than the exception. This interlegality has a number
of important implications for how the work of jurisdiction is in-
volved in generating a legal geography of limits to, and extensions
of, the legislative governance of e-waste in Canada and the US.
As in Canada, in the US the interlegality of jurisdiction is the
rule rather than the exception. Of the 24 states that had passed
e-waste legislation by the end of 2010 only two, New Hampshire
and Utah, do not include any explicit reference to jurisdictions
other than their own. The rest include general references to
compliance with all local, state, and federal laws and seven states
(California, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island,ons with e-waste legislation.
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Directive 2002/95/EC is the EU’s Reduction of Hazardous Sub-
stances (RoHS) law adopted in 2003 (European Parliament,
2003). For example, in 2003 California became the ﬁrst state to
pass legislation designed to regulate e-waste. Among other
requirements, the California legislation prohibits electronics to be
sold into the state, ‘‘if the electronic device is prohibited from being
sold or offered for sale in the European Union on and after its date
of manufacture, to the extent [prohibited by] Directive 2002/95/
EC’’ (State of California, 2004, Section 1.b). Doing e-waste in Cali-
fornia, as in six other US states, enfolds the legal doing of e-waste
in other countries on other continents Thus interlegality is central
to the generation of California’s and other states’ jurisdiction over
e-waste.
Also like the situation in Canada, California and other states ex-
tend their jurisdiction beyond their territory. Section 17 of Califor-
nia’s law regulates exports of e-waste from the state. Exporters
must,
[d]emonstrate that the exportation of the waste or device is
conducted in accordance with applicable United States or appli-
cable international law [and] [d]emonstrate that the waste or
device will be managed within the country of destination only
at facilities whose operations meet or exceed the binding deci-
sions and implementing guidelines of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development for the environmentally
sound management of the waste or device being exported.
The demonstration required [. . .] applies to any country of des-
tination, notwithstanding that the country is not a member of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(State of California, 2004 Section 17c, e).
By banning exports unless certain conditions are met, California
is, in effect, extending its jurisdiction in ways that it comes to reg-
ulate production in those countries where the use of rubbish mate-
rials as inputs into manufacturing for both domestic consumption
and export is the norm (see Gregson, 2011; Gregson et al., 2010;
Lepawsky and Billah, 2011). Yet the issue remains unsettled. When
Washington state attempted to ban exports under its e-waste law,
Governor Gregoire vetoed those portions of the bill banning them
while assenting to the rest. She noted, ‘‘based on legal advice, the
State of Washington does not have the necessary authority to pro-
hibit export of electronic waste’’ (Washington State Assembly,
2006, p. 34). At stake is a particular version of where the proper
jurisdictional authority over exports resides (i.e., federal or state).
Signiﬁcantly, however, what is not at issue is the implicit extension
of jurisdiction over manufacturing when it takes place in countries
outside the OECD or EU. So while it is possible to extend jurisdic-
tion over manufacturing, the legislative governance of e-waste in
Canada and the US only does so when it is manufacturing for Them
and not Us.
7. How
There are two variations in how Canadian and US jurisdictions
ﬁnance their e-waste management programs. The ﬁrst type is ﬁ-
nanced through fees charged to consumer–citizens at the time of
purchase to cover the cost of recycling the product if and when it
later enters the recycling system; and those that ﬁnance the sys-
tem through fees charged to electronics manufacturers which are
then passed onto consumer–citizens – sometimes visibly, some-
times not – in the purchase price of new electronic products. De-
spite the differences between these two ﬁnancing systems, their
effects are the same: they democratize the action of public decision
making so long as it is limited to decisions about waste already
produced while marketizing the actions of manufacturers, e-wasterecyclers, and paramarket organizations so long as it enables them
to appropriate additional increments of value from consumer–cit-
izens by externalizing costs to them.
In Canada, all provincial programs, except Ontario’s which al-
lows producers to choose whether such fees are visible or invisible,
require a system of visible fees paid by consumer–citizens to ﬁ-
nance their e-waste recovery programs. In the US, only California
uses such a system. The remaining states ﬁnance their e-waste
recovery systems through invisible fees paid by consumer–citi-
zens. The visible fees go by different names – advanced disposal
fees, environmental handling fees and the like – but they all work
in the same way: at the time of purchase a fee is charged separately
from the purchase price of a new electronic product. The amount of
the fee varies depending on the kind of item. For example, in Alber-
ta an ‘‘environmental fee’’ of $5.00 is charged on a laptop and up to
$45.00 on a television (ARMA, 2008). California’s ‘‘electronic waste
recycling fee’’ ranges from $6.00 for a device with a screen size of
up to 15 in. to $10.00 for a device with a screen of 35 in. or more
(State of California, 2003). These fees are used to cover the cost
of recycling those items if and when they enter the recycling
stream in the future.
The second variety of ﬁnancing model operates in the province
of Ontario and all US states, save for California. In this model fees
are paid by manufacturers in order to ﬁnance these jurisdictions’
e-waste recovery systems. Though producers pay these fees to
public authorities delegated to manage the take back programs,
the costs to producers are nominal because there is no regulatory
language in any jurisdiction prohibiting producers from passing
these costs onto consumer–citizens in the form of higher purchase
prices. Though 20 of the 24 US states include regulatory language
prohibiting fees being charged to consumer–citizens at the time
an end-of-life electronic product is returned for recycling, this in
no way stops a producer from charging that cost to consumers at
the time of purchase. No Canadian or US jurisdiction includes reg-
ulatory language prohibiting producers from building in the cost of
recovery fees (i.e., an ‘invisible’ fee) into the initial purchase price
of new electronic products. Ultimately, then, the ﬂow of funds for
the ﬁnancing of e-waste recycling in all Canadian and US jurisdic-
tions originates with consumer–citizens. As a consequence, the
work of jurisdiction in the legislative governance of e-waste in
both countries enables producers to continue to externalize the
costs of end-of-life product management, a result diametrically op-
posed to what EPR is supposed to achieve.
The technicalities of how the fees under both types of ﬁnancing
model are calculated also play an important role in the work of
jurisdiction. The speciﬁc formulas used to calculate the fees vary
between jurisdictions but all rely on one or a combination of the
following factors: the number of units shipped or sold into a prov-
ince or state by a given manufacturer, the total weight of the latter,
and/or estimates of the service life of given products (InterGroup
Consultants and Forkast Consulting, 2008, p. 17). What is impor-
tant about these factors is how they engage in a politics-of-what
even as they generate the seeming unimpeachability of numbers.
Concern about the toxicity of e-waste is one of the primary justiﬁ-
cations for its legislative governance. Yet, sales ﬁgures, mass, and/
or service life are only tenuously related to toxicity (e.g., 1 g of alu-
minum and 1 g of mercury are equivalent in terms of mass, but to-
tally different in terms of toxicity). So decisions about how to
quantify e-waste and the fees used to process it are enacting a par-
ticularly, even peculiarly, formatted version of ‘the good’, one that
would seem to at least partially attenuate what the legislative gov-
ernance of e-waste is explicitly supposed to achieve: incentiviza-
tion toward green(er) design. A manufacturer could, in principle,
reduce what it is charged under a given provincial or state e-waste
program by designing lighter machines that are no less toxic or,
perversely, more toxic than earlier models. Without a fee structure
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changes that enhance clean(er) production (e.g., reducing toxic-
ity, increasing repairability, reusability, and recyclability), the
desired goals of EPR-based e-waste legislation are unlikely to be
achieved.
8. Who
Since it is consumer–citizens who ultimately ﬁnance the recy-
cling of e-waste in jurisdictions with such legislation, electronics
manufactures are able to continue to externalize the costs of ﬁnal
disposition of their products. However, in addition to manufactur-
ers, a collection of paramarket organizations also beneﬁt from the
ﬂow of funds derived from consumer–citizens. For example, in
Canada all provincial e-waste management programs require pro-
cessors to have certiﬁed business processes in place (e.g., ISO
14001) and to use independent auditing ﬁrms to ensure compli-
ance with program requirements. Certiﬁcation and auditing prac-
tices add to the cost of the program operations. Consequently, a
portion of the visible or invisible fees paid by consumer–citizens
at the time of purchase eventually ﬂow to auditing ﬁrms and cer-
tiﬁcation bodies. In Canada, it is EPSC’s Recycling Standard and its
provisions for independent auditing to which participating proces-
sors must adhere. In the US, two competing certiﬁcation systems
are now supported by the Environmental Protection Agency: the
‘‘Responsible Recycling’’ (or ‘‘R2’’) system and the ‘‘e-Stewards’’
system (US Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.). R2 has been
developed in a multi-stakeholder process since 2006 and is sup-
ported by the Institute for Scrap Recycling (ISRI), a trade associa-
tion. E-stewards was developed by the Basel Action Network
(BAN), an environmental NGO, after it left the R2 negotiation pro-
cess over frustrations with how R2 handles issues such as exports,
the deﬁnition of hazardous materials, and labor practices (Basel
Action Network, 2008). A heated debate has emerged about the
merits and demerits of each system (Basel Action Network, 2008;
ISRI, 2010; WR3A, n.d.).
Despite that debate about differences, the two certiﬁcation sys-
tems share commonalities that are important for the argument I
am making here regarding the corralling of democratic decision
making to waste already produced. Both R2 and e-Stewards rely
on the American National Accreditation Board (ANAB), ‘‘a not for
proﬁt non-government organization’’ (ANAB, n.d.), to accredit third
party for proﬁt auditing ﬁrms that are qualiﬁed to assess recycling
ﬁrms applying for R2 and/or e-Stewards certiﬁcation (ANAB, n.d.;
Basel Action Network, n.d.; ISRI, n.d.). ANAB charges a fee of
$5000 per assessor day for its accreditation services for the R2
and e-Stewards certiﬁcation systems (ANAB, 2009, p. 1). Conse-
quently, the ﬁnancing models for jurisdictions with e-waste regu-
lations provide a ﬂow of funds to auditing ﬁrms and certiﬁcation
bodies. So while, ISRI’s support of R2 is a continuation of its broad-
er support for market based solutions to managing e-waste, BAN’s
turn to a market model is a new development with some poten-
tially important implications for the group’s stance toward waste
from electronics. Among them is that it must manage the e-Stew-
ard certiﬁcation as a brand which, as BAN itself points out, must
have ‘‘value in the marketplace’’ (Basel Action Network, n.d.).
Among other things, protecting its brand identity has lead BAN
to ﬁle an intellectual property protection suit against ISRI over
the use of the trademarked phrase ‘‘certiﬁed electronics recycler’’,
after ISRI acquired the assets of the International Association of
Electronics Recyclers (Basel Action Network v. International Asso-
ciation of Electronics Recyclers, 2010). Also, the e-Stewards system
funnels licensing fees paid by e-Stewards certiﬁed companies to
BAN. While BAN retains its non-proﬁt status, it uses revenue from
these fees for, ‘‘marketing of the e-Steward program [. . .], program
costs (staff, overhead), research and investigations, media work,legal fees, ﬁlms, reports, brochures, websites’’ (Basel Action Net-
work, n.d.). In other words, e-Steward licensing fees help ﬁnance
some of the group’s core activities as an ENGO.
Collectively, what is important about ISRI’s and BAN’s certiﬁca-
tion systems is that they are increasingly being directly incorpo-
rated into the legislative governance of e-waste (at least ﬁve
states explicitly incorporate references to ISRI’s standards: Hawaii,
Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas). Thus, unelected
paramarket organizations and their ﬁnancial interests are being di-
rectly incorporated into the public legislative governance of e-
waste. As a phenomenon, the folding of private interests into pub-
lic law is neither new nor unique to e-waste governance (e.g., Scott
et al., 2011; Zumbansen, 2011) but it is an assembling of the social
in a legal way such that public decision making is allowed to delib-
erate only over waste after it has been produced while production
itself remains taboo; meanwhile, ﬁrms and paramarket organiza-
tions have their ability to extract value from consumer–citizens
enhanced.9. Conclusion: e-waste, responsibility, and the taboo of
production
Speaking at E-Scrap 2010, an industry conference and trade
show, Doug Smith, director of corporate environment safety and
health at Sony, had this to say about EPR legislation during a ses-
sion on certifying manufacturers: ‘‘Extended producer responsibil-
ity in the United States has nothing to do with product redesign. It
doesn’t encourage [it] [. . .] The bottom line is, EPR has turned into a
funding mechanism for local government to collect electronics [for
recycling]. Which is ﬁne. Just call it that’’. Smith’s indictment of ex-
tended producer responsibility legislation in the US applies equally
to Canada. The Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment’s
(CCME) ﬁrst principle ‘‘for electronics product stewardship’’ is that,
‘‘[r]esponsibilities associated with management of e-waste are pri-
marily borne by producers of the products, where ‘producer(s)’
means the manufacturer, brandowner or ﬁrst importer of the prod-
uct who sells or offers for sale the product in each jurisdiction’’
(Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, 2004, p. 1).
Yet, in the legislative governance of e-waste in Canada, as in the
US, this has not come to pass. Even where EPR is explicitly referred
to in legislation, the work of jurisdiction ensures that consumer–
citizens, not producers, ultimately ﬁnance all provincial and state
e-waste management programs while no individual manufacturers
take ﬁnancial or physical responsibility for the end-of-life manage-
ment of their products under such legislation (individual brand
manufacturers may have their own take-back programs, but these
are voluntary and not a consequence of any e-waste legislation
passed in Canada or the US).
The work of jurisdiction in the legislative governance of e-waste
in Canada and the US has several implications. First, because elec-
tronics manufacturers are able to externalize disposal costs to con-
sumer–citizens through the fee-based systems described above,
those ﬁrms’ proﬁt margins are protected or even enhanced if they
can pass on the cost of recovery in the purchase price of new elec-
tronics. One of the potential outcomes of these fee-based systems,
then, is to delay or defer changes to production processes and
product design that would reduce the environmental and health
risks of the very products that Canadian and US e-waste legislation
is ostensibly designed to encourage (Jacob, 2007). The latter point
suggests that Canadian and US e-waste regulations are creating
what some have called ‘the recycling trap’ (McDonough and
Braungart, 2002; Turner, 2007) – a situation where a multitude
of options for the clean(er) production (Clean Production Action,
2008; Thorpe, 1992, 1993) of original manufactures may be
bypassed in favor of recycling goods as an alternative to disposal.
3 The use of EULAs raises the issue of the legal doctrine of patent exhaustion, a
fuller analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Brieﬂy, patent exhaustion
doctrine establishes that a patent is ‘‘‘exhausted’ upon the ﬁrst sale of a product. Once
the item has been sold, the purchaser is free to use, repair, or resell it without fear o
patent liability’’ (von Lohmann, 2007). A key US case (Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart
Inc., 1992; see Bernstein et al., 2008; Stern, 1993, 1994) broke with preceden
concerning patent exhaustion doctrine and ruled that patent owners could circum-
vent the doctrine by placing conditions on the sale of products to consumers (e.g.
‘single-use only’, ‘personal use only, not for resale’). A case involving the printer
manufacturer Lexmark ruled in favour of the company when it placed single-use only
labels on its toner cartridges, making it illegal for other ﬁrms to reﬁll those cartridges
and offer them for sale as an alternative to new cartridges purchased from Lexmark
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building in greater material and energy efﬁciencies, altered prod-
uct design that makes repair and disassembly easier, and/or the
use of less or non-toxic components during manufacturing. Instead
a post-consumption recovery system is instituted (i.e., recycling)
that only tries to divert material deemed to be waste at the last
possible moment before products enter the waste stream. The
net result is that, contra the desideratum of legislative governance
of e-waste, extended producer responsibility is enacted as extended
consumer responsibility. This is not necessarily a negative outcome,
but it ensures that effort is focused on what to do with waste al-
ready produced and formats production as taboo. Due to the work
of jurisdiction all of the manufacturing processes that give a mate-
rial fate to electronics (e.g., their chemical composition, the degree
of repairability, the length of their useful lives) that Canadian and
US consumer–citizens buy are forbidden topics for democratic
input.2
Second, the ﬁnancing models in conjunction with standards and
certiﬁcation systems enfolded into Canadian and US e-waste regu-
lations are reinforcing the enactment of e-waste as a post-con-
sumption problem. So for example, in Canada whereas the
CCME’s principles include the minimization of environmental
and human health impacts ‘‘throughout the product life-cycle,
from design to end-of-life management’’ (Canadian Council of Min-
isters of the Environment, 2004, p. 1), the EPSC’s recycling standard
focuses exclusively on end-of-life management requirements
(EPSC, 2009). The same is true in the US where the emphasis is also
on treating e-waste after it has already been produced, rather than
trying to prevent or minimize its creation in the ﬁrst place. As a
consequence it is increasingly difﬁcult to discuss the question of
what to do about e-waste as having anything to do with manufac-
turing or any other part of the commodity chain except post-con-
sumption. Production remains taboo. This taboo that restricts how
e-waste can and cannot be done is reinforced by the standards and
certiﬁcation systems enfolded into Canadian and US regulations.
Despite the differences in the systems, they share the common
strategy of focusing all certiﬁcation activity on how materials
and data are handled after they are in the recycling/recovery
stream while leaving manufacturing out of their purview.
Third, turning to market mechanisms to handle e-waste as a
post-consumption problem means that the ﬁrms and paramarket
organizations that derive revenue from this stream have at least
reduced, if not eliminated, any incentives they may have for dimin-
ishing the volume of e-waste moving through the recycling stream
(cf. Ackerman, 1997; Diederich, 1993; Lehman, 1999). Given ISRI’s
identity as a trade association representing scrap and recycling
ﬁrms its interests in this regard are not surprising. On the other
hand, BAN’s turn to the market may have the perversely paradox-
ical consequence of the group becoming more concerned about
recycling post-consumption e-waste under particular standards
than about reducing or preventing the production of e-waste in
the ﬁrst place. An emerging controversy illustrates the issue:
BAN has certiﬁed Samsung as an e-Steward just as the company’s
manufacturing processes are coming under criticism for possible
links to leukaemia in its workers (CBC News, n.d.; Chun-hwa,
n.d.; Hankyoreh, n.d.; Si-soo, 2010; You-chul, 2010).
Fourth, the work of jurisdiction has the implicit effect of regu-
lating production in countries prohibited from receiving exports
of e-waste from Canadian and US jurisdictions. Such imports2 Partial exceptions would be California, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New York
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin which adopt the EU’s Reduction of Hazardous
Substances (RoHS) Directive 2002/95/EC. However, though the RoHS directive
regulates material composition and thus affects design and manufacturing, it says
nothing about other design and manufacturing issues such as durability, repairability
reusability, etc.
(Arizona Cartridge Remanufac. v. Lexmark Intern., 2003). A more recent case ruled
against LG Electronics’ use of ‘single use only’ and ‘not for resale’ labels (Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2008; see Austin, 2008; van Houweling, 2008
but the Electronic Frontier Foundation maintains that ‘‘the current legal situation
allows for patent owners to experiment with after-sale license agreement tactics’’ and
modify sales to consumers (and thus the transfer of property rights) into ‘conditiona
sales’ ‘‘with restrictions on post-sale activities, such as resale, repair, and modiﬁca-
tion’’ (von Lohmann, 2008; see also Dufresne, 2009).,
,support substantial economies of repair and refurbishing and are
an important source of inputs into new rounds of manufacturing
in non-OECD countries like Bangladesh where substantial manu-
facturing economies are premised on the use of scrap materials
as ‘raw’ inputs for ‘new’ production (for example, 80–90% of the
steel used in Bangladesh’s construction industry is derived from
ship-breaking, not mining, see Amin and Billah, 2007; Gregson
et al., 2010; Lepawsky and Billah, 2011). In this sense, the legisla-
tive governance of e-waste in Canadian provinces and US states ex-
tends their jurisdiction such that they come into contact with and
effect people and places beyond their own legalized borders. So
while production for Canadian and US consumer–citizens remains
taboo, e-waste legislation implicitly extends its regulatory reach
into production by and for Others. Highlighting this arrangement
of jurisdiction is different than arguing that this arrangement
should not be thus. Instead, the lesson is that extending public
decision making to manufacturing (and thus to waste production
in Gille’s sense of the term) can be done since it is already happen-
ing, even if unintentionally, for countries prohibited from receiving
Canadian and US e-waste exports.
How might the work of jurisdiction be done differently so that
e-waste legislation in Canada and the US might be done better?
Space permits only a brief consideration, but at least three possibil-
ities derive from focussing on Mol’s notion of a politics-of-what
and Gille’s call to democratize production. First, the legislation
could be modiﬁed to institute genuine individual producer respon-
sibility (IPR, see Section 4). If the goals of such of a system were to
increase the durability, reuse- and reparability of electronics while
also reducing or eliminating their toxicity, appropriate fee struc-
tures that would reward ﬁrms who alter design toward those ends
would have to be devised. Such a system would also have to in-
clude a least some collective responsibility for so-called ‘legacy
waste’ – the end of life electronic products of now defunct manu-
facturers. Furthermore, an IPR system would need to ﬁnd accept-
able solutions to the proliferation of end-user license agreements
(EULAs) being used by some electronics companies to restrict what
consumers are legally allowed to do with their electronics (e.g., in
terms of reuse, repair, and resale) after they purchase them.3
Second, e-waste legislation could be passed covering national
jurisdictions (rather than individual provinces and states) or even
NAFTA. The point would be to create a single law to avoid the
patchwork of legislation that is currently emerging. This would en-
large the market over which electronics manufacturing ﬁrms must
comply with e-waste legislation thus increasing the economic
incentives to modify their production and take-back practices. An
example of this kind of scenario is evident in the EU’s Reduction
of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) directives which restrict the
use of particular materials with toxic characteristics (e.g., lead,f
,
t
,
)
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sents such a large market the RoHS directives have created a de fac-
to global standard for electronics manufacturing because it is more
economical for manufactures to produce all their products that are
also sold in the EU to that jurisdiction’s material speciﬁcations,
rather than different speciﬁcations for different markets. In effect,
the EU has decided for other jurisdictions what the material spec-
iﬁcations will be of electronics also sold in them. However, passing
such national laws for Canada or the US as a whole, or indeed for
NAFTA, would necessarily have to engage in debates over the dis-
tribution of sovereign power enshrined in the countries’ constitu-
tions (see Section 3).
Third, the EU’s RoHS model of governance could be adopted
more widely and extended to materials it does not currently cover.
RoHS is an example of legislation that does indeed reach beyond
the factory gate and directly effect the material speciﬁcations of
manufactured electronics before they become waste by limiting
the presence of a suite of toxic materials in ﬁnal products (lead,
mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, polybrominated biphe-
nyls, and polybrominated diphenyl ether). In this sense, RoHS has
lead to cleaner production of electronic products for consumers.
However, RoHS has nothing to say about other materials used in
production, including the solvents that have been linked to nega-
tive health consequences for electronics production workers (see
Section 5 and Reuters, 2011; Watts, 2011), nor has it anything to
say about other work conditions.
Thinking with Mol alerts us that each of these three possible
ways of doing the good are highly partial and situated; each sets
up the doing of ‘the good’ as ‘good’ in particular ways. IPR can
achieve the desired ends of clean(er) production only if it is specif-
ically designed to avoid the recycling trap. It will do nothing for the
issue of legacy waste unless some forms of collective responsibility
are built into such systems. IPR must also engage with the work of
jurisdiction over property rights vis-à-vis EULAs if goals include
enhancing the durability, reusability, and reparability of electron-
ics. Passing legislation covering national jurisdictions or those of
a trade bloc like NAFTA can also help achieve the ends of clean(er)
production, but such legislation necessarily means engaging in
wider debates with which waste production is bound including, in-
ter alia, the distribution of federal, provincial/state, and municipal
powers. The RoHS model of governance does reach beyond the fac-
tory gate to create what Gille (2007) would describe as a safer
material world because the material characteristics of manufac-
tured products are modiﬁed before they become waste in the ﬁrst
place. Yet, by asking what and whose world is made safer we are
confronted with conditions for production-line workers that may
only be marginally safer, if at all. Even a production system that
is safer in terms of chemicals in use is not necessarily a safer world
for workers depending on many other factors that materially affect
their safety (e.g., length of work shifts or intensity of work on the
line; see Barboza, 2010; Duhigg and Barboza, 2012). Clean(er) pro-
duction is not necessarily fair(er) production.
Taken together, what I have argued is that examining the work
of jurisdiction – the what, the where, the who, and the how of legal
governance – is one way of following the action of assembling the
social as opposed to understanding law, space, and society as three
domains that ‘impact’ on each other. In that sense, I have added to
Valverde’s (2009) proposition that legal technicalities are a re-
source for theory building. I have shown that in the legal technical-
ities of managing a particular waste stream are settlements about
how political forms and market forms are to be assembled and dis-
tributed. I argued that the work of jurisdiction around e-waste dis-
tributes worldly action such that it is democratized as long as it
limits public decision making to deliberations about waste already
produced and marketized as long as it enhances the ability of man-
ufacturers, e-waste recyclers, and certain paramarket organizationsto appropriate value. Paying attention to the work of jurisdiction
also contributes to legal geographic thought in that the legislative
governance of e-waste suggests jurisdiction, as a key legal and geo-
graphical category, can be more multiple, distributed, and patchy
than its theorization as deﬁnitively bounded territory allows. In
the legislative governance of e-waste, provincial and state jurisdic-
tion is composed of multiple legal elsewheres folded together inter-
legally; and their jurisdiction is explicitly and implicitly extended
beyond their own borders. This work of jurisdiction is, then, not
neutral. It plays a direct role in generating the very thing (e-waste)
it claims to only govern. In formatting the thing, distributions of
worldly action are generated. Rather than jurisdiction being ‘‘noth-
ing more than the map of law’s interaction with society’’ (Ford,
1999, p. 929) there is, in the work of jurisdiction, no society, law,
and space as separate domains, but worldings; the formatting of
moral cosmologies; political and economic forms operationalized.
The social assembled.
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